

High Drama in Foggy Bottom

by JONATHAN MIRSKY

Our long-term objectives are: (1) to eliminate so far as possible Communist influence in Indochina and to see installed a self-governing nationalist state which will be friendly to the U.S. and which, commensurate with the capacity of the peoples involved, will be patterned upon our conception of a democratic state as opposed to the totalitarian state which would evolve inevitably from Communist domination; (2) to foster the association of the peoples of Indochina with the Western powers, particularly with France, with whose customs, language, and laws they are familiar . . . ; (4) to prevent undue Chinese penetration and subsequent influence in Indochina so that the peoples of Indochina will not be hampered in their natural developments by the pressure of an alien people and alien interests. . . .

While the nationalist movement in Vietnam . . . is strong, and though the great majority of the Vietnamese are not fundamentally Communist, the most active element in the resistance of the local peoples to the French has been a Communist group headed by Ho Chi Minh. This group has successfully extended its influence to include practically all armed forces now fighting the French, thus in effect capturing control of the nationalist movement.

These phrases, an indication of American blindness to history, and an augury of rivers of blood, form the first part of a "Policy Statement" of the Department of State dated September 27, 1948. They constitute a final refutation of the "quagmire theory." More than twenty years ago the U.S. undertook to remold Vietnamese nationalism. That we have failed is no indication of lack of vigor or resolve. The Vietnamese just didn't want to surrender. That's where we are now, in 1972. The Pentagon Papers, sometimes brightly, sometimes fitfully,

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THE PENTAGON PAPERS: As Published by The New York Times

by Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith,
E. W. Kenworthy, and Fox Butterfield

Quadrangle, 810 pp., \$15;
Bantam paperback, \$2.25

THE PENTAGON PAPERS: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam

The Senator Gravel Edition

Beacon, 4 vols., 2,899 pp., \$45;
paperback, \$20

UNITED STATES-VIETNAM RELATIONS, 1945-1967: Study Prepared by the Department of Defense Printed for the Use of the House Committee on Armed Services

Government Printing House,
12 vols., \$50

throw light on those terrible decades.

We have now three editions of them: a one-volume selection by *The New York Times*, a four-volume selection by Beacon Press, and a twelve-volume "complete" set issued by the Department of Defense. Ordered by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1967, the twelve volumes contain nearly 7,000 pages, 4,000 of narrative and 3,000 of photostated documents drawn, for the most part, from Defense, Central Intelligence, and the State Department. Parts of the set have been deleted, and four last sections have been dropped.

We are indebted to Senator Mike Gravel (D., Alaska) for the four-volume set, which has almost all the narrative of the original and excludes no censored portions, but omits several thousand pages of documents. Of the documents it does contain, many are



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not to be found in the government volumes. While some of these are drawn explicitly from the *Times*, sources for most are not given.

When one piles the three editions into separate heaps, prepared to leaf systematically back and forth, confusion sets in. Minor annoyances first: the Tonkin Gulf mystery is made maddening by some machine at Beacon that did only odd pages. Other documents in the multivolume sets are excised here and there so that it requires two readers doing a duet to stumble on the variations—which are often important. The Defense edition contains no Johnson papers; the Beacon omits papers for most of 1954 through most of 1960. In both, a narrative covers the period of the missing documents. The worst flaw in the Beacon volumes is the exclusion of hundreds of documents from the Roosevelt and Truman years. These, illuminating and damning, are to be found in the government's set. For important subjects like Laos, defoliants, the early commitment to Ngo Dinh Diem, and the advice of John Kenneth Galbraith, the Defense collection must be read, while on other questions, such as Diem's murder, the influence of glamorous intellectuals, and general Cold War/gangster rhetoric, it is supplemented by the Beacon.

The government censor who dealt with the murder in November 1963 of Diem reveals more than he hides. It is not merely the white spaces highlighted by stern "deleted" that draw our attention. Even though several pages in the "chronology" of volume III are blanked out—dealing with clandestine meetings between "Lt. Colonel" Lucien Conein of the CIA who harkens back to the glory days of OSS in Tonkin—the Great Deleter must have dozed off. There, on xxvi, in all its guilty innocence, we find for 28 October, 1963:

That evening Conein meets Don [a general, and leading anti-Diem conspirator] again and the latter says that the plans may be available for [Ambassador Henry Cabot] Lodge only four hours before the coup. Lodge should not change his plans to go to Washington on October 31 as this would tip off the palace. Some details of the organization of the coup committee are discussed.

The rest of the meticulous chronological jottings leading up to the murder are expunged. So is much of the narrative—for which we can easily turn to Beacon. But evident soon is more shoddy work by the government censor: "The first Washington message to Lodge on October 30 revealed that White House anxiety about the possible failure of a coup attempt . . . had increased." Later the same day yet another cable arrives, cautioning the new

envoy: "But once a coup under responsible leadership has begun, and within these restrictions, it is in the interest of the U.S. government that it should succeed."

The murderous train of events began as Lodge arrived in Saigon in August. A cable, drafted by Roger Hilsman but approved by President Kennedy (who reportedly regretted it later) said, in part: "We wish to give Diem reasonable opportunity to remove Nhu, but if he remains obdurate, then we are prepared to accept the obvious implication that we can no longer support Diem." This cable, too, is in the Defense volume. A string of cables follows—all reprinted in Beacon, many from the *Times*—in which Ambassador Lodge, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, John Richardson (the CIA Saigon station chief, soon to be sent packing by a suspicious Lodge), and McGeorge Bundy implicate themselves forever.

The situation in the war, steadily worsening, pressed on coup-men and U.S. accomplices alike. CIA chief Richardson, presumably sacked for being too close to Ngo Dinh Nhu, sold out his friend in an August 28, 1963, cable to CIA director John McCone: ". . . if the Ngo family wins now [in the struggle with the generals], they and Diem will stagger on to final defeat at the hands of their own people and the VC. Should a generals' revolt occur and be put down, GVN will sharply reduce American presence in SVN." The following day Lodge cabled Rusk: "We are launched on a course from which there is no turning back: the overthrow of the Diem government."

Momentarily uncertain, General Maxwell Taylor and Secretary McNamara report to the President on October 2 that they see no possibility of a "successful coup" and predict an end to the war in 1965, although the "Viet Cong effort . . . has not yet been seriously reduced in the aggregate." "A further disturbing feature of Nhu," they remark, "is his flirtation with the idea of negotiating with North Vietnam. . . . This . . . suggests a possible basic incompatibility with U.S. objectives." They conclude by cautioning again against a coup. This cable, naturally, is in the Pentagon volume. As the pace towards murder quickens, the Pentagon is silent and Beacon resumes. In an "Eyes only for Secretary Rusk" message of October 5, Lodge suggests reassuring Duong Van Minh through Conein. The next day Lodge receives a guarded go-ahead from CIA in Washington. On the 25th Lodge sends a cable in which he assures the White House:

CAS [CIA] has been punctilious in carrying out my instructions. I have personally approved each meeting between [Tran Van] Don and Conein. . . .

Conein, as you know, is a friend of some eighteen years' standing with Gen. Don. . . . I believe that our involvement to date through Conein is still within the realm of plausible denial. CAS [CIA] is perfectly prepared to have me disavow Conein at any time it may serve the national interest.

This cable has been left in the Government volume. Censorship, if such this is, or isn't, must be a dying art.

On the day of the coup Lodge visited Diem, who plaintively asked what the U.S. wanted. "The atmosphere of this meeting," state both multi-volume editions, "must have been strained in the extreme in view of Lodge's awareness of the imminence of the coup." At coup headquarters, "where he was authorized to maintain telephone contact with the Embassy," Conein "provided reliable reporting throughout the next two days." The Beacon and Defense edition both quote the celebrated 4:30 p.m. phone conversation in which Lodge, responding to the frantic Diem's plea for guidance, replies: ". . . it is 4:30 a.m. in Washington and the U.S. government cannot possibly have a view."

Beacon describes how, on November 3, the second day after the coup, the generals and Lodge celebrated: "It began with mutual expressions of satisfaction at the success of the coup. . . . Lodge was elated, both at [its] efficiency and success." Washington, however, was "shocked" and "dismayed" by the "brutal and seemingly pointless murder [of Diem]. . . . President Kennedy was reportedly personally stunned at the news, particularly in view of the heavy U.S. involvement in encouraging the coup leaders." Nevertheless, on November 2, the day after the coup, Richard Phillips, spokesman for State, declared: "I can categorically state the U.S. government was not in any way involved in the coup attempt." And, two years later, returning to New York, Henry Cabot Lodge asserted, "The overthrow of the Diem regime was a purely Vietnamese affair. We never participated in the planning. We had nothing whatever to do with it."

Covert operations across borders into Laos and North Vietnam, and even farther to Thailand, provide more examples of what the Pentagon censor seeks to obscure. One episode, involving espionage teams—American-sponsored, -led, and -equipped—has been smiled at as yet another example of the 007 spirit. But what were these groups—directed in part by the then "Major" Conein—supposed to do? "The northern team," reports the Beacon edition, "had spent the last days of Hanoi in contaminating the oil supply of the bus company for a gradual wreckage of engines in the buses, in taking the first

actions for delayed sabotage of the railroad . . . and in writing detailed notes of potential targets for future paramilitary operations. . . . These activities, in October 1954, took place while the ink was scarcely dry on the Geneva accords (indeed, some delicacy in this regard prevented the team "from carrying out the active sabotage it desired to do"). What we see here—in the minor destruction, the putting of teams "in place," the employment of astrologers to write false predictions, and the infiltration of refugees—is the beginnings of the "if I can't have it I'm going to hurt you" attitude that informs much American activity in the later years of the war. When we quit there's going to be blood on the floor.

In July 1961, General Edward G. Lansdale provides a memorandum (omitted in the government edition) for Maxwell Taylor, Kennedy's military adviser, and for McNamara, Rusk, and Allen W. Dulles. He describes the operations of the First Observation Group, under CIA "control" and supply, which penetrates "denied (enemy) areas." In addition to activities in Laos, the CIA controlled also the Philippine "Eastern Construction Company," headed by "Frisco" Johnny San Juan, an ex-assistant of President Magsaysay who campaigned against the Huks. Eastern Construction, a "nonprofit organization," was actually "a mechanism to permit the deployment of Filipino personnel in other Asian countries, for unconventional operations. . . ." Philippine Armed Forces and governmental personnel were "sheep-dipped" and served abroad. "Its personnel helped write the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam. . . ." Later, Lansdale describes in a brief passage CIA's "proprietary" Civil Air Transport. To the innocent world this company was the national airline of Taiwan.

While the above projects do not seem unusually damaging, considering the source, when we turn to activities in Laos we see the beginnings of a policy which in 1972 has resulted in the near destruction of an entire culture. In this instance both large editions supply critical information on a neglected topic.

In a "Report on Southeast Asia" (NSC 5809), August 12, 1959, approved by President Eisenhower, and not included by Beacon, we read that "Progress has been made in furthering United States objectives in Laos . . . there are indications that the prestige and morale of the Communist Neo Lao Hak Xat have deteriorated, while those of the non-Communists have improved." No mention is made of the CIA-supported coup which undid a recent election in which the NLHX, to the dismay of the U.S., did all too well. Therefore, we are not surprised to learn from another Pentagon exclusive, a special

national intelligence estimate of September 18, 1959, that "We believe that the Communist resumption of guerrilla warfare in Laos was primarily a reaction to a stronger anti-Communist posture by the Laotian government and to recent U.S. initiatives in support of Laos."

By February 10, 1960, the Operations Coordinating Board, in a report not included by Beacon, relays the hopeful news that "Major elements of the Lao leadership are firmly committed to an anti-Communist stand. . . . This evaluation is strengthened by the recent political crisis of December 1959-January 1960. . . . While [the new government] has made public declarations of neutrality (in consonance with our recommendations), all the Ministers on whom the Ambassador called have made clear that they would continue to look to close cooperation with the U.S." Again, no mention of the CIA, which by stimulating the "crisis" pushed Laos further towards civil war. Our present ally, Souvanna Phouma, was a victim of this American inspired crisis.

One of the most vital documents to our understanding of the centrality of Laos, omitted by Beacon, is printed whole by the Defense Department. It consists of a limited distribution "Memorandum of Conversation" dated April 29, 1961. Attending, among others, were Rusk, McNamara, Robert Kennedy, General Curtis E. Le May, Marine commandant David M. Shoup, and McGeorge Bundy. There was general agreement that the CIA's man, Phoumi Nosavan, was collapsing in the face of the Pathet Lao. After Deputy Assistant Secretary John Steeves rather inaccurately reminded the officers in the room

that it was "on the pleas of our military that we supported Phoumi," General George Decker remarked: ". . . we can not win a conventional war in Southeast Asia; if we go in, we should go in to win, and that means bombing Hanoi, China, and maybe even using nuclear bombs."

Later in the conversation General Le May, while admitting "that he did not know what U.S. policy is in Laos," urged among other actions that "we should go to work on China itself and let Chiang take Hainan Island." McNamara added that to do it all by air "you would have to use nuclear weapons." Finally, a "Mr. Bowles" (Chester?) concluded that "the main question to be faced was the fact that we were going to have to fight the Chinese anyway in two, three, five, or ten years and that it was just a question of where, when, and how. . . . Le May said that, in that case, we should fight soon since the Chinese would have nuclear weapons within one or two years."

It will be remembered that in the late spring and summer of 1961 General Lansdale produced memoranda at the request of the National Security Council. Much of the May 8, 1961, "Program of Action," omitted by Beacon, is included by Defense, which, however, excises a good deal of the Annex on covert operations. Both editions include a section on Laos that suggests the infiltration of "teams under light civilian cover to Southeast Laos to locate and attack Vietnamese Communist bases and lines of communications. . . . Training of teams could be a combined operation by CIA and U.S. Army Special Forces."

Although at that time an intelligence



"After five hundred rejection slips, you tell me you're a troll and not a muse?"

Book Forum

Letters

report made plain the indigenous nature of the South Vietnamese struggle, on May 11, in a "National Security Action Memorandum," printed in both editions, McGeorge Bundy, at the instructions of the President, approved these covert intrusions.

Clearly, the teams had already been "in place" for some time. In his July 1961 memorandum for Maxwell Taylor, McNamara, Rusk, and Allen Dulles, Lansdale reported encouraging developments in Laos. This document, explaining the early stages of the now notorious CIA Secret Army, is found only in the *Times* and *Beacon* editions: "About 9,000 Meo tribesmen have been equipped for guerrilla operations, which they are now conducting with considerable effectiveness in Communist-dominated territory in Laos.... The military leader is Lt. Colonel Vang Pao [an ex-French lieutenant] who is the field commander. Command control of Meo operations is exercised by the Chief CIA Vientiane with the advice of Chief MAAG Laos." Nine CIA operations officers and nine Special Forces personnel were "advising." Lansdale adds a poignant note with painful future implications: "As Meo village [sic] are overrun by Communist forces and as men leave food-raising duties to serve as guerrillas, a problem is growing over the care and feeding of non-combat Meos. CIA has given some rice and clothing to relieve this problem. Consideration needs to be given to organized relief, a mission of an ICA [predecessor of AID] nature, to the handling of Meo refugees and their rehabilitation."

Too late, already too late! By this time the Meo, once a hardy mountain tribe devoted to cultivating opium poppies, have been nearly exterminated as a fighting force, and small boys now bear arms for the CIA.

This operation is well understood by the Pathet Lao. In their little-known report *Twelve Years of U.S. Imperialistic Intervention and Aggression in Laos*, published in 1966, we find that "... an important and long-term policy of the United States is to sow division between the nationalities and to build up reactionary political and military elements among the minority nationalities in order to undermine national liberation movements.... Therefore they have set about exploiting as best they can the complex nationality problems in Laos to pursue and push forward their policy of division.... The Americans have sought to win the allegiance of a number of tribal chiefs in the minority areas, particularly in the Miao [original spelling] inhabited regions.... Vang Pao is enjoying particular attention and favor from the United States.... Though outwardly

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No Drivel

Gilbert Geis's review of *Inside: Prison American Style* and *Going to Jail* [SR, Dec. 11] is a very welcome change from the usual drivel written about convicts and their recent verbalistic boot-strapping. I salute Professor Geis for the aura of wisdom which he shows.

J. Kustowski,
Los Angeles, Calif.

Liberating Influence

Benjamin DeMott's assessment of Henry Miller [SR, Dec. 11] overlooks some of Miller's best writing. I have in mind the marvelous travel book on Greece, *The Colossus of Maroussi* (1941), and the writing on philosophical themes, particularly the two essays on the late-blooming mysticism in Balzac's novels.

Admittedly, the weaknesses in Miller's prose are many. Mr. DeMott's remark about the ill effects of Miller on other writers does not take into account the tremendously liberating influence of Miller's style on the metaphysical daring and cosmic vibrations of just such a significant force in letters as Norman Mailer.

Kenneth Hacking,
Providence, R.I.

When Henry Miller laments "the bitterness in the heart" of Americans, does he ever consider how much of it he has caused? As Kate Millet has precisely pointed out, his writing is imbued with a pernicious attitude toward women. His delight in degrading, debasing, and sexually exploiting women in his *Sexus* may be celebrated by male critics, but it leaves women feeling hurt and angry.

Barbara Engel,
St. Paul, Minn.

The review of Henry Miller's work came as a shock. Never before had SR been guilty of printing filth. Surely that space could have been used for something other than the lewd writings of a lecherous old man.

We no longer want the *Saturday Review* coming to our home.

Mr. and Mrs. William Arginbright,
Spokane, Wash.

Why do we need to know what a filthy sewer Henry Miller's mind, life style, and words are?

And, in the words of the reviewer, *The Room*, by Hubert Selby [SR, Dec. 11], is sexual chaos and cruelty.

Wouldn't it be better for the moral climate of the world for you to simply ignore books such as these—not bring them to public attention, but let them drown in their own private sewers?

"Lift up a standard for the people." Isaiah 62:10.

Edith M. Laing,
La Jolla, Calif.

Wyeth the Thinker

Franz Schulze's dismissal of *The Wyeths* [SR, Dec. 11] reveals an insensitivity

which is all too common lately.

The collection of N. C. Wyeth's the searching of a soul was arrived at, not through the thinking of bistros of artists' colonial solitary agony. The written educated man are no less inspiring!—than those of each of these men deals with of existence: Wyeth with to attain the approval Angelo with his terrible his money problems.

That Wyeth's conclusion is sufficiently engaging as a thumbnail interest of the unrelated critique of the most subjective thinking, so independent inordinately interesting account.

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Larger Print for Less

In referring to the Large of Webster's Seventh New Edition [SR, Dec. 4] D states that "the present highest priced dictionary it would seem that the still the second edition of *World Dictionary*." According to published information, the

The Larger Print Edition, indexed, is priced at \$8. Handbook lists Webster's *Dictionary*, thumb indexed, the *American Heritage Dictionary*, indexed, at \$9.95. Frankly, as a matter of policy, price competitors.

G. &
S

History Distorted

Contrary to D. E. Fortu Howard Mumford Jones's [SR, Dec. 4], President Telt did not "annex" Puerto Guam; Spain ceded them States under the terms of Paris of 1898.

Furthermore, Roosevelt Nobel Peace Prize for his the Russo-Japanese War, Soviet War.

Snob

In Alden Whitman's old *Jennie* [SR, Nov. 6] the describes Jennie's last "some buck," which is certainly her first husband, Wins father, who is dismissed snob." Does this suggest spoke only to real syphili Mary

High Drama

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taking orders from Vientiane, his troops and administration are actually independent from the central puppet authorities and have gradually become an autonomous regime."

Other early indications of U.S. interest and concern to be found in the Defense collection are decisions to use defoliants. In a "National Security Action Memorandum" dated November 30, 1961, McGeorge Bundy transmits President Kennedy's approval of a program which should lead "to food denial" for the enemy—but "only if the most careful basis of resettlement and alternative food supply has been created." Slightly before this, at the beginning of November, Maxwell Taylor makes a historic suggestion to the President. Seizing on the almost divine opportunity of flood control, he urges the dispatch of 8,000 troops, *prepared for combat*, for relief work. The purpose is to "provide a U.S. military presence capable of raising national morale and of showing to Southeast Asia the seriousness of the U.S. intent to resist a Communist takeover." In another "Eyes only for the President" dispatch General Taylor, while stating that the size of the force "need not be great," warns that "the U.S. troops may be called upon to engage in combat to protect themselves." Unfortunately, he mispredicts: "As an area for the operations of U.S. troops, SVN is not an excessively difficult or unpleasant place to operate. . . . NVN is extremely vulnerable to conventional bombing. . . ."

Whereas Secretary McNamara concedes the value to Diem of an 8,000-man flood relief force, he insists in a Presidential memorandum dated November 8, 1961, that "it will not convince the other side (whether the shots are called from Moscow, Peking, or Hanoi) that we mean business. . . . [We must issue] a warning through some channel to Hanoi that continued support of the

Vietcong will lead to punitive action against North Vietnam. . . . In view of the logistic difficulties faced by the other side, I believe we can assume that the maximum number of U.S. forces required on the ground in Southeast Asia will not exceed six divisions or about 205,000 men."

Thus, in effect, McNamara put the situation in the harshest—and truest—light. To go ahead now would mean a long pull and eventual involvement at least with Hanoi. "But at this time," the narrative states, "even people like Galbraith (and Schlesinger . . .) saw no alternative to continuing to support Vietnam, although not to continuing to support Diem personally. Galbraith was, if anything, more optimistic . . . than was the Taylor Report." The narrative then collapses into handwringing: "It is hard to think of any realistic counter-arguments to the case for settling the dispute and get on with either trying to do better in the war, or get rid of Diem."

The debate about Diem began early and continued until his murder. On August 4, 1954, for instance, the "intelligence community" had begun to express doubts. In a memorandum dated 7 December, 1954, found only in the Pentagon edition, Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson reports that Diem's old friend Mike Mansfield felt that "we should continue to do whatever was possible to support the government of Diem." And whom did he suggest to implement it? Wesley Fishel, the CIA's man from Michigan State!

In a cable sent via CIA, dated November 20, 1961, Galbraith, by then Ambassador to India, spoke his mind to JFK. This document, not available in Beacon, admits the situation in Vietnam is "indubitably bad." Shall we withdraw? "Given an even moderately effective government," says Galbraith, "and putting the relative military power into perspective, I can't help thinking that the insurgency might very soon be settled." The next day in a second cable Galbraith continues: ". . . having

started on this hopeless game we have no alternative, but to play it out for a minimum time. . . . The only solution must be to drop Diem . . . [which] will neither be difficult nor unduly dangerous. . . ." "We should not," he adds, "be alarmed by the army as an alternative. It would buy time and get a fresh dynamic." Then, raising the specter of China behind the Vietnamese struggle, Galbraith suggests that the Canadians and Australians be approached. "There can be no longer," he says, "be any question the food those two are supplying is of nearly desperate importance to the Chinese. . . . Properly approached, the Canadians and Australians would surely make the point forcefully."

There is, of course, no end to what "idea men," as opposed to intellectuals, can conceive. In 1966 when the bombing of North Vietnam was "going badly" (for the U.S. in one sense, for the Vietnamese in another), Roger Fisher of Harvard's Law School sent a memo to John McNaughton of Defense. "He had in mind a primarily air-seeded line of barbed wire, mines, and chemicals. . . ." This would "arrest infiltration." It was a hot idea. So hot that George Kistiakowsky, Karl Kayser, Jerome Wiesner, and Jerrold Zacharias—who, happily, "were not identified with the vocal academic criticism of the Administration's Vietnam policy"—made a similar suggestion to Defense. This led to the summer study of 1966 called JASON in Wellesley Hills, Massachusetts, which also concluded that bombing was ineffective and suggested a barrier between North and South Vietnam. The result was what is now called, with great pride by General Westmoreland, "the electronic battlefield." The JASON staff urged the implanting of millions of Gravel mines, thousands of sensors, hundreds of airstrikes, tens of thousands of cluster bombs. These scientists, top-rank members of liberal academe, had really come up with something.

The problem for the idea men whose ideas keep popping up in the Pentagon Papers is Indochina *itself*. They don't know anything about the area, although they may have been there numerous times.

Eisenhower, who was always praised for his sensitivity and insight, couldn't figure it out. Excised from the twelve-volume edition, but included in Beacon, are his last musings just before Kennedy's inauguration:

He wondered aloud [according to Clark Clifford] why, in interventions of this kind, we always seem to find that the morale of the Communist forces was better than that of the democratic forces. His explanation was that the Communist philosophy appeared to produce a sense of dedication on the part of its adherents, while



there was not the same sense of dedication on the part of those supporting the free forces.

Maxwell Taylor didn't get that far. "The ability of the Viet Cong," he said on November 27, 1964, "continuously to rebuild their units and to make good their losses is one of the mysteries of this guerrilla war. . . . Not only do the Viet Cong units have the recuperative powers of the phoenix, but they have an amazing ability to maintain morale. Only in rare instances have we found evidences of bad morale among Viet Cong prisoners or recorded in captured Viet Cong documents."

A 1970 RAND study on the motivation and morale of twenty-two North Vietnamese prisoners solves Taylor's problem: "The enemy soldier trusts his leaders, likes his political officer, gains strength from criticism/self-criticism and the three-man cell, draws pride from his military successes, is encouraged by what he sees as the unalterable support and sympathy of the people, and relies heavily on what he insists is the righteousness of his cause. This parallels the findings of some of the 1965, 1966, and 1967 RAND studies on the same subject."

What the men whose voices we hear in the Pentagon documents don't know is that the history of the Vietnamese is their 2,000-year struggle to be free. Vietnamese peasants are not neutral rice-eaters "who just want to be left alone" but ardent nationalists. Yet, like all human beings, they burn and bleed very easily. *One hour* in the civilian "burn ward" at, say, Quang Ngai in

1965 would have done wonders for Lodge, Rusk, the Bundys, Taylor, Dulles, and maybe even Galbraith, Wiesner and Kayser. They would find life less mysterious and might have fewer "ideas."

What do we hear when they speak? We hear of "progressive squeeze-and-talk," of "orchestration," "crescendo," and "scenario." South Vietnam may be left "like a patient who died despite the extraordinary efforts of a good doctor," while three "audiences" watch: "the Communists," "our allies," and "the U.S. public." Each must receive a different "message." The story may be bittersweet, even sad: "It is essential—however badly SEA may go over the next two to four years—that the U.S. emerge as a 'good' doctor. We must have kept promises, been tough, taken risks, gotten bloodied, and hurt the enemy very badly."

Hurting. Hurting the enemy, making him ache—or die. The Senate Subcommittee of Refugees has recently reported:

In this year, 1971, more civilians are being killed and wounded in the three countries of Indochina, and many more made refugees, than at any time in history. Most of the casualties are caused, and people made refugees, by American and allied military activities.

Shall we, unable to achieve an end we should never have desired, destroy the ancient cultures and peoples of Indochina because we cannot win their hearts and minds? Are their bodies, then, so cheap?

Estes Kefauver

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turned down his solicitations for support. When he could attract "professionals" he used them. Thus, his 1952 campaign manager was Gael Sullivan, a protégé of Chicago Mayor Ed Kelly and former executive director of the Democratic National Committee. In 1956 one of his key aides was J. Howard McGrath, a former chairman of the Democratic National Committee who served briefly as Attorney General in the Truman administration.

A far more serious shortcoming is Gorman's failure to adequately explain Kefauver's personality or his political appeal. Kefauver was a complicated man whose private thoughts and feelings seldom appear in this biography. His political career rested on his ability to appeal to the grass roots, yet he was, in his wife's words, "not much interested in individuals." He was somewhat of an enigma to his friends and family and, apparently, to

Gorman as well. Gorman even seems puzzled by Kefauver's political success, which he attributes to a combination of populist rhetoric and "a special kind of charisma" that allowed him to win the confidence of voters. In fact, much of Kefauver's appeal probably derived from his role as a champion of embattled community values. In attacking crime, corruption, boss rule, and monopoly, he spoke to the deepest fears of those Americans who were alarmed by the erosion of traditional small town values. His last battle, fittingly enough, was an unsuccessful fight against the Communications Satellite Corporation, a private monopoly created by the Kennedy administration and dominated by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company.

Robert Griffith teaches history at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He wrote "The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate."

Answer to Wit Twister, page 75
steno, onset, notes, tones, stone.

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